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PROPRIETY OF AWARD OF STOCKHOLDER'S COUN-
SEL FEES UNDER SECTION 16B OF SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT
Dottenheim, one of the stockholders of Emerson Electric
Mfg. Co., engaged an attorney to investigate the security
transactions of the president of the corporation to determine
if his activities were in violation of Section 16b of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. The attorney discovered that the
president had realized a short-term profit which, by the
statute, should inure to the benefit of the corporation.' In
a letter to the corporation, he demanded that it enforce this
right to recover the profit. The directors of the corpora-
tion had known of the profit of the president and of the
corporation's right to recover, but-had decided not to press
the claim for the time being. However, because of the de-
mand by Dottenheim's attorney the corporation enforced its
claim immediately, and the president paid the profit of $57,-
872 without the necessity of suit. Dottenheim brought this
action against the corporation to recover compensation for
the services of his counsel. The corporation contended that
attorney's fees could not be allowed because the profit had
not been recovered as a result of a stockholder's suit, and
that there could be no recovery for simply serving a demand
and furnishing information already fully known to the di-
rectors. The court held that the investigation and subse-
quent demand by Dottenheim's attorney had benefited the
corporation and allowed Dottenheim compensation for reason-
able attorney's fees in relation to the benefit. Dottenheim v.
Emerson Electric Mfg. Co., 77 F. Supp. 306 (E. D. N. Y.
1948).
1. Any profit realized by a person from transactions within a per-
iod of six months in securities issued by a corporation in which
he is an officer, director or major stockholder "shall inure to
and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on
the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not
repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months."
48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78p (b) (1940). The
profit may be recovered in an action by the corporation, or by a
security holder by a suit in behalf of the corporation.
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The underlying purpose of Section 16b of the Securities
Exchange Act is to protect the securities markets; the stat-
ute applies only to transactions in securities listed on the
stock exchanges.2 But in attaining the primary objective,
an alternate purpose is accomplished; that of eliminating all
possible profits from insiders' stock transactions.3 Although
the section provides for suit by a stockholder as a means of
enforcing the corporate right, it is silent concerning reim-
bursement of the enforcing stockholder for expenses incurred
by him. While it might thus be argued that a court is not
permitted to allow expenses to a stockholder who acts to
enforce the section,4 that question has been set at rest for
the district court in this case. For the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit has held that a stockholder who
has unsuccessfully demanded that his corporation sue and
who then himself sues and recovers in the corporation's be-
half is entitled to reasonable compensation for attorney's
fees.5 Unless such compensation is allowed, reasoned the
circuit court, no stockholder would be willing to take action,
and the enforcement provision would be ineffective., Clearly
then Section 16b does not prevent the district court from
allowing Dottenheim his expenses. The problem is simply
2. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, 136 F.2d 231, (C. C. A. 2d
1943); Yourd, Trading in Seurities by Directors, Officers and
Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MIcH.
L. REV. 133 (1939).
3. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1934);
Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 84,
72d Cong., 2d Sess., and on S. 56 and S. 97, 73d Cong., 1st and
2d Sess. (1934).
4. Section 9e of the Securities Exchange Act grants an action to
persons injured as a result of unlawful manipulation of security
prices, and provides for discretionary allowance of attorney's
fees to the injured party. 48 STAT. 889 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. §
78i (e) (1940). Section 18a provides for discretionary allow-
ance of attorney's fees to a person who sues to redress an injury
sustained as a result of reliance upon the misleading statements
of another party. 48 STAT. 897 (1934), 15 U. S .C. A. § 78r (a)(1940).
5. Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (C. C. A. 2d 1947);Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, 136 F.2d 231 (C. C. A. 2d 1943).
It is controversial whether attorney's fees should have been read
into § 16b in view of the principle that all parts of a statute should
be construed together. The advisability of this interpretation is
not discussed here.
6. "In many cases the possibility of recovering attorney's fees will
provide the sole stimulus for the enforcement of § 16b." Smolowe
v. Delendo Corporation, 136 F.2d 231, 241 (C. C. A. 2d 1943).
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one of the propriety of allowing attorney's fees to a stock-
holder whose attorney's investigation and demand were ef-
fective to move the corporation to act in its own behalf to
enforce its right.
Two lines of reasoning may be advanced to support the
action of the district court. The first proceeds upon the
ground that the award of counsel fees to Dottenheim will
encourage stockholders to investigate the activities of man-
agement. That this effectuates the statutory purposes of
protecting the securities markets from manipulation and of
preventing fiduciaries from siphoning profits from their
beneficiaries is self-evident. The fact that it may sometimes,
as in this case, be unnecessary for the stockholder to sue to
redress a violation of the statute is not determinative. The,
vital question is simply whether the activity for which com-
pensation is claimed is directly effective to promote the pur-
poses sought to be achieved by the statute. It was competent
for the court to find that Dottenheim's activity was so ef-
fective.
The second argument in support of the court's decision
is based upon analogy. In those cases where suit has been
brought by a stockholder under the statute, the courts have
considered the statutory method of enforcement to be in the
nature of an equitable derivative suit.7  Courts award coun-
sel fees to stockholders who have prevailed in equitable
derivative suits8 on either of two rationales. One theory is
that the stockholder is acting for a class, and that the fund
recovered should be charged with the expense incurred by
7. Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (C. C. A. 2d 1947);
Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, 136 F.2d 231 (C. C. A. 2d 1943);
Pottish v. Divak, 71 F. Supp. 737 (S. D. N. Y. 1947); Note, 148
A. L. R. 313 (1943); 46 MicH. L. REV. 99 (1947). The stock-
holder's derivative suit is available in equity to pursue a right
of action to which the corporation is entitled but wrongfully re-
fuses to enforce. Cf. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450 (1881);
Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331 (U. S. 1856); Johnson v. Inger-
soll, 63 F.2d 86 (C. C. A. 7th 1933); Whittaker v. Brictson Mfg.
Co., 43 F.2d 485 (C. C. A. 8th 1930); Wayne Pike Co. v. Ham-
mons, 129 Ind. 368, 27 N. E. 487 (1891); Marcovich v. O'Brien,
63 Ind. App. 101, 114 N. E. 100 (1916); Tevis v. Hammersmith,
31 Ind. App. 281, 66 N. E. 79 (1903); Hichens v. Congreve, 4
Russ. 562, 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (1828); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS§ 145 (rev. ed. 1946).
8. Wolfes v. Paragon Refining Co., 74 F.2d 193 (C. C. A. 6th 1935);
Watus v. Disbrow & Co., 70 F.2d 572 (C .C. A. 8th 1934); Beau-
dette v. Graham, 267 Mass. 7, 165 N. E. 671 (1929); Note, 152
A. L. R. 909 (1944).
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the representative before it is distributed to the class.9 The
other theory is quasi-contractual; the corporation which has
received the benefit of the attorney's services should pay
the reasonable value thereof.10 Dottenheim's conduct taken
as a preliminary step to enforcing the statute is comparable
to similar conduct by a stockholder who intends to bring an
ordinary derivative suit. If a court might properly award
counsel fees under similar circumstances in a derivative suit,
that is persuasive argument for the propriety of the award
in the Dottenheim case.
The purpose of the stockholder's derivative suit is to
control intra-corporate abuse and to assure that those bene-
fits to which the corporation is entitled are obtained.1 Since
such suits are expensive, and -often the defendants will apply
corporate funds to place every conceivable obstacle and pro-
cedural delay before the stockholder, " it is essential that a
stockholder be certain before suit that he will not incur a
large uncompensated expense. In order to discourage abuse
of the derivative suit, 13 courts have refused to allow a stock-
holder attorney's fees when he is unsuccessful in obtaining a
benefit for the corporation. 4
The court in the Dottenheim case required a benefit.
This benefit is found in the fact that the demand of Dotten-
heim's attorney impelled the directors to enforce a right
which they had decided not to press for a time. Thus the
demand had made a fund available to the corporation earlier
9. See Lamar v. Hall, 129 Fed. 79, 82 (C. C. A. 5th 1904); Hand v.
Savannah & Charleston R. R., 21 S. C. 162, 178-179 (1884).
10. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 532 (1881); Buell v.
Kanawha Lumber Corp., 201 Fed. 762, 767-769 (E. D. S. C. 1912);
Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits,
39 CoL. L. REV. 784, 789 (1939).
11. For a realistic evaluation of the stockholder's suit as a restraint
on intracorporate abuse see Hornstein, Legal Controls for Intra-
corporate Abuse-Present and Future, 41 COL. L. REv. 404, 425
(1941).
12. See Berlack, Stockholder's Suits-A Possible Substitute, 35 MIcH.
L. REV. 597 (1937).
13. See Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 269 N. Y. Supp.
360, 367 (1934). For a discussion of the strike suit as an abuse
of the stockholder's derivative action see Washington, Stockholder's
Derivative Suits: The Company's Role, and a Suggestion, 25 CORN.
L. Q. 361, 369 (1940). See also Note, 34 COL. L. REv. 1308
(1934).
14. "Fair and reasonable fees for results actually achieved, with due
consideration for time and effort required, will neither encourage
strike suits nor discourage real ones." Winkelman v. General
Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 504, 506 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
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than it would otherwise have been. 15 Assuming that the di-
rectors would have acted to enforce the corporation's claim
before the statute of limitations had run, there is an element
of conjecture in arriving at the exact sum by which Dotten-
helm's activity benefited the corporation. This fact should
not limit a court's conception of a benefit to an exactly identi-
fiable sum the recovery of which was solely attributable to
the services of the stockholder's attorney. It should be enough
that there is an unmistakable contribution of some type upon
which counsel fees can be based. 6 It seems proper that the
objection that no suit was filed should not be a bar to allow-
ance of. counsel fees when the reasons for such an award are
present.'7 Initiation of a suit is simply evidence of benefit,
the essential factor; to require suit to have been brought by
Dottenheim would be to give undue importance to techni-
cality.18
Several objections to the decision may be advanced, but
examination reveals that they lack substance. A prerequisite
to allowance of counsel fees for stockholder's derivative ac-
15. The recovery was made ten months before the expiration of the
statute of limitations. The court assumed that the directors would
have enforced the claim at some time prior to the running of the
statute of limitations; thus, the entire $57,872 recovered could
not be considered as resulting from the demand. The money bene-
fit was then computed by placing $57,872 at 4% interest for ten
months which gave a figure of $1929.05. On this basis attorney's
fees of $1000 were awarded. Dottenheim v. Emerson Electric Co.,
77 F. Supp. 306, 308 (E. D. N. Y. 1948).
16. The form of benefit from stockholder's derivative suits does not
seem to be of great importance. "The principle on which allow-
ances in derivative actions are made is that those who share in
the benefit produced by one of their number should justly share
in the expense of producing the benefit. Under that principle it
is manifest that the award depends on the production of the bene-
fit and not upon the form ha e benef i ay take." Bernstein,
J. in Bysheim v. Miranda, 45 N. Y. S.2d 473, 475 (1943). Se~e
Allen v. Chase Nat'l. Bank, 40 N. Y. S.2d 245, 252 (1943).
17. It is true that in every case where counsel fees have been awarded
the stockholder had filed suit. See cases cited note 7 supra. But
counsel fees have been awarded where satisfactory settlement had
been made subsequent to the filing of the action by the stockholder
but before trial. Meighan v. American Grass Twine Co., 154 Fed.
346 (C. C. A. 2d 1907); Greenough v. Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co.,
52 Idaho 599, 18 P.2d 288 (1932); Baker v. Seattle-Tacoma Power
Co., 61 Wash. 578, 112 Pac. 647 (1911). The fact that suit -need
not be pressed to a judgment is evidence that the requirement is
simply to give conclusive evidence of benefit; if benefit can be
found without suit filed, it would then seem proper to award at-
torney's fees.
18. See opinion of Judge Inch denying motion to dismiss the principal




tions is that the corporation must have refused to enforce
its right of action satisfactorily." The fact that the corpora-
tion did not refuse to enforce its claim in the instant case
might be considered as interposing an objection to allowance
of attorney's fees. However, that objection must fall when
it is considered that the requirement of refusal by the cor-
poration is to insure against unnecessary litigation or un-
desirable interference by the stockholder.20 The requirement
is applicable only where a stockholder actually initiates suit;
since Dottenheim did not sue, it is unnecessary that he prove
a refusal by the corporation to sue. It should be enough that
the stockholder make it appear that his acts were not un-
desirable, inconsequential, or unnecessary. Dottenheim's ac-
tivities were none of these; they were indispensable to an
early recovery of the profit, and there was the danger that
the claim would be allowed to lapse.2 1 The necessity of the
investigation and demand must be a question of fact to be
decided in each case. A sine qua non test would probably
suffice; that is, if the benefit would not have been recovered
without the attorney's services, those services were .necessary
and may be the subject of reasonable compensation.
It may be contended that the allowance of counsel fees
for this type of activity by the stockholder will operate to
encourage a substitution of the business judgment of the
19. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1935); Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288 (1935); Sias v. John-
son, 86 F.2d 766 (C. C. A. 6th 1936); Wright v. Floyd, 43 Ind.
App. 546, 86 N. E. 971 (1908). A demand on the corporation to
enforce its claim is not necessary if it can be shown that under
the circumstances it would have been futile. Zeleznik v. Grand
Riviera Theater Co., 128 F.2d 533 (C. C. A. 6th 1942); Nisonoff
v. Irving Trust Co., 68 F.2d 32 (C. C. A. 2d 1933); Greer Inv.
Co. v. Booth, 62 F.2d 231 (C. C. A. 10th 1932); Tevis v. Ham-
mersmith, 31 Ind. App. 281, 66 N. E. 79 (1903).
20. Counsel fees will be denied when the stockholder's suit was un-
necessary. Evans v. Diamond Alkali Co., 315 Pa. 335, 172 Atl.
678 (1934). See Lucking v. Delano, 129 F.2d 283, 286 (C. C. A.
6th 1942); Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative
Suits, 39 COL. L. REv. 784, 802 (1939).
21. It is probable that the directors could have been held liable for
mismanagement in a stockholder's derivative suit if they had al-
lowed the statute of limitations to expire, in view of the clarity
of § 16b of the Securities Exchange Act. See Greenwood v.
Greenblatt, 173 Ga. 551, 161 S. E. 135 (1931); Shaw v. Harding,
306 Mass. 441, 28 N. E.2d 469 (1940); Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326
Mo. 185, 30 S. W.2d 976 (1930); Carson, Current Phases Of




stockholder for that of the officials of the corporation.22
Such a consequence is not necessary, because an official may
still employ his business judgment to refuse to enforce the
corporate right.23 If the stockholder then initiates a deriva-
tive suit and there is no recovery for the corporation, the
stockholder will not be allowed counsel fees.24  If the cor-
poration receives a benefit as a result of the stockholder's
activity, either in the form of an earlier recovery of a claim
or recovery by a stockholder's suit, this would indicate that
the officials of the corporation had probably abused their
privilege of business judgment. In the cases under Section
16b of the Securities Exchange Act the element of business
judgment is of little importance; the directors are given no
discretion as to whether they will sue promptly to enforce
the statute.25
It may be objected that a probable consequence of award-
ing counsel fees in the present case will be to encourage in-
discriminate investigations of corporate activities by numer-
ous stockholders, resulting in costly interference in the effi-
cient operation of the business. 26 There can be no valid con-
tention of burdensome investigation when the stockholder
seeks to enforce Section 16b of the Securities Exchange Act.
The stockholder may obtain his information from the reports
that the corporate officials are required to file with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, and he need not inspect
22. The law will not hold directors liable for honest errors of business
judgment when they act in good faith. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141
U. S. 132 (1891); Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co.,
41 F. Supp. 334 (D. C. Del. 1941); Helfman v. American Light
& Traction Co., 121 N. J. Eq. 1, 187 Atl. 540 (Ch. 1936); Gamble
v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N. Y. 91, 25 N. E. 201 (1890).
23. Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U. S. 455 (1903);
Post v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 200 Fed. 918 (C. C. A. 8th
1912); Groel v. United Electric Co. of New Jersey, 70 N. J. Eq.
616, 61 Atl. 1061 (Ch. 1905).
24. Evans v. Diamond Alkali Co., 315 Pa. 335, 172 Atl. 678 (1934).
25. If the corporation fails to sue to recover the profit within sixty
days after demand by the stockholder, the stockholder may sue to
enforce the claim in behalf of the corporation. 48 STAT. 896(1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78p (b) (1940).
26. Every stockholder of a private corporation has the right at com-
mon law to inspect and examine the books and papers of the cor-
portation at reasonable times and places, and for proper purposes.
Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148 (1905); Stone v. Kellogg, 165
Ill. 192, 46 N. E. 222 (1896); Varney v. Baker, 194 Mass. 239,
80 N. E. 524 (1907); White v. Manter, 109 Me. 408, 84 Atl. 890
(1912); Eldred v. Elliott, 161 Mich. 262, 126 N. W. 219 (1910);
Latimer v. Herzog Teleseme Co., 78 N. Y. Supp. 314 (1902).
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the books of the corporation.2 7 Further it is settled that a
corporation may refuse to allow investigation of its books by
a stockholder at times when such investigation would un-
reasonably interfere with the management of the business. 28
The very fact that no expenses of investigation will be al-
lowed unless it is shown to have produced a benefit to the
corporation will discourage unreasonable investigations.
It must be recognized that the present holding will en-
courage investigations. The requirement that there be bene-
fit to the corporation will be a factor in limiting any abuse
to which the decision may be conducive, even though the de-
termination of whether or not there was a benefit will be a
difficult question in some cases. In view of the practices
in which numerous corporate officials have engaged in the
past,29 the desirability of closer supervision of their activities
more than offsets the slight possibility that it will lead to
burdensome investigations. Traditional concepts of corporate
entity with management by officials rather than stockholders
will not be substantially impaired. Instead, ownership in-
terests will exert a legitimate influence upon those in con-
trol to assure a faithful performance of fiduciary duties.
JURIES
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGING OF NEGRO VENIRE-
MEN AS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NEGRO
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
Three Negroes were indicted in the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia on a charge of murder
in the first degree. Nineteen members of the Negro race
27. 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78p (a) (1940). This
section makes it mandatory for corporate officials to file monthly
reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission in regard
to their transactions in the securities of the corporation. These
reports are public records available for inspection.
28. Breslauer v. S. Franklin & Co., 205 Ill. App. 372 (1917); Weihen-
mayer v. Bitner, 88 Md. 325, 42 Atl. 245 (1898); Watkins v.
Donnell Mfg. Co., 129 Mo. App. 206, 107 S. W. 1112 (1908);
Conerty v. Butler County Oil Ref. Co., 301 Pa. 417, 152 Atl. 672(1930); Kuhback v. Irving Cut Glass Co., 220 Pa. 427, 69 Atl.
981 (1908); 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2242 (perm.
ed. 1943).
29. See Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency on
S. 84, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., and on S. 56 and S. 87, 73d Cong., 1st
and 2d Sess., (1934); Tracy and MacChesney, The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. Rsv. 1025, 1032 (1934).
[Vol. 24
